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D. T. Suzuki and the Invention of Tradition
Victor Sōgen Hori
Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō 鈴木大拙貞太郎, or D. T. Suzuki, was born  in 1870 and died in 1966. While he was alive, his many admirers 
lauded him highly, sometimes describing him as the living embodiment of 
Zen Buddhism. But in the decades after his death, academic critics in the 
West have castigated him severely. Robert Sharf has charged that Suzuki’s 
account of Zen is not only a historically inaccurate “invention of tradition,”1 
but also an expression of Japanese nationalism extolling the cultural superior-
ity of Japan as a nation and the Japanese as a race.2 Bernard Faure conducted 
a critique of Suzuki’s account of Zen from the point of view of rhetoric rather 
than doctrine; this critique on the one hand revealed Suzuki’s sectarian biases 
and logical inconsistencies3 and on the other hand exposed Suzuki’s account 
of Zen as a “secondary Orientalism.”4 Brian Victoria has argued that although 
Buddhism is supposed to be a pacifist religion, the Zen school in Japan will-
ingly supported the Japanese military’s war efforts during World War II and 
that Suzuki actively supported the Japanese military aggression.5 
Is Suzuki guilty of these offences? How just are these criticisms? In this 
paper, I would like to examine Robert Sharf’s claim that Suzuki’s exposition 
AN EARLY version of this paper was presented at the World Congress of the International 
Association of the History of Religions held in Erfurt, Germany, in 2015. At that time, I 
received valuable feedback from Professors John Harding, Alec Soucy, André van der Braak, 
Jessica Main, and Donald Lopez. I also thank Heather Midori Yamada, Michael Pye, and 
The Eastern Buddhist anonymous reviewer for useful comments and advice.
1 Sharf 1995a, p. 246.
2 Sharf 1993, p. 5.
3 Faure 1993, pp. 54–60.
4 Faure 1993, p. 5.
5 Victoria 1997.
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of Zen is an invention of tradition and revisit Faure’s notion of second-
ary Orientalism. I will not be dealing with the criticisms levelled by Brian 
Victoria.6 My discussion divides into two parts, the first dealing with the 
critique of Zen experience and the second dealing with authentic Buddhism 
and cultural nationalism. 
I.   THE CRITIQUE OF “EXPERIENCE”
In his writings, D. T. Suzuki emphasized that the experience of satori, or 
enlightenment, was absolutely essential to Zen. Suzuki wrote, “At all events 
there is no Zen without satori, which is indeed the Alpha and Omega of Zen 
Buddhism. Zen devoid of satori is like the sun without its light and heat. 
Zen may lose all its literature, all its monasteries, and all its paraphernalia; 
but as long as there is satori in it it will survive to eternity.”7 This statement 
is just one example of many such statements asserting the unique character 
and essential role of satori. Satori, he said, is not a fact of information or an 
idea explainable in words or a concept understood by the intellect. Satori 
cannot be conveyed by one person to another person through language; “Zen 
defies explanation”;8 “Satori can thus be had only through our personally 
experiencing it.”9 
Where Did Suzuki’s “Satori” Come From? 
This picture of Zen, centered around the satori awakening experience, is the 
conventional way we think of Zen today. Sharf, however, argues that Suzu-
ki’s claims about the importance and nature of satori are not part of tradi-
tional Zen/Chan but in fact are part of a modernist reconstruction of Zen 
which has been projected back in time so that we now unthinkingly assume 
it to be history. He has rightly pointed out that Suzuki’s exposition of Zen 
arose as part of a larger movement by Japanese Buddhists to create a “new 
Buddhism” in the face of the advance of the West into Asia. The historical 
background is well known but it is important to recall the political context 
in which this happened. We need to remind ourselves of how directly the 
search for a new Buddhism was triggered by the fear of being colonized by 
the Western powers and the desire to be respected by the Western nations. 
6 See the reply to Brian Victoria in Satō 2010.
7 Suzuki (1927) 1970, pp. 229–30.
8 Suzuki (1927) 1970, p. 243.
9 Suzuki (1927) 1970, p. 230.
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In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed his “black ships” into Uraga 
浦賀 Bay, forcefully breaking the Japanese policy of national isolation. 
Thereafter, the Tokugawa government was coerced into signing unequal 
treaties with the Western powers. In the technical language of international 
diplomacy at the time, Japan was formally categorized as a “barbarian” 
state; it was not considered “civilized” as European states were. When 
the Tokugawa shogunate fell in 1868 and the Meiji emperor assumed the 
throne, the new Japanese government sought to modernize the country by 
studying the Western nations and selectively adopting Western institutions 
and practices. The Meiji government, alive to Western notions of rationality 
and science, considered Buddhism corrupted by superstition and thus sub-
jected it to a persecution (haibutsu kishaku 廃仏毀釈, or “abolish Buddhism, 
destroy Śākyamuni”), which forced ordained monks and nuns back into 
secular life, confiscated temple property, and destroyed temple buildings 
and artifacts.10 Although there were local players who had their own rea-
sons for shutting down Buddhist temples, the persecution was motivated by 
the desire to get the classification of Japan in international diplomatic terms 
upgraded from “barbarian” state to “civilized” state. At the same time, the 
new Meiji government also promoted Shinto as a national ideology. Japa-
nese Shinto nationalists ignored the long history of Buddhist adaptation to 
Japanese culture and criticized it as a foreign religion imported from the 
foreign countries of China, Korea, and India.11 In this crisis for survival, 
defenders of Japanese Buddhism needed a new formulation of Buddhism, 
a Shin Bukkyō 新仏教 or “New Buddhism,” which on the one hand would 
satisfy Western conceptions of modernity and scientific rationality while 
on the other hand stake a claim to the new Japanese national identity then 
under construction.12
As a young man, Suzuki had spent the years from 1897 to 1909 in Illi-
nois working as an assistant to Paul Carus, a scholar and publisher who, 
in order to bridge the gap between science and religion, was advancing 
the “Religion of Science.” In Carus’s vision, when religion is purified of 
its superstitious and irrational elements, and when science is purified of 
its atheism and materialism, then religion and science will point at the 
“unity of the realm of spirit and the realm of scientific truth.”13 Sharf says 
10 Ketelaar 1993.
11 Ketalaar 1993, pp. 48, 55, 241.
12 Sharf 1993, pp. 3–6.
13 Sharf 1993, p. 17.
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that D. T. Suzuki’s answer to the need for a new Buddhism in Japan was 
to borrow Paul Carus’s vision of the religion of science and to promote it 
under the label of Zen. In addition, during his eleven-year stay in America, 
Suzuki was exposed to the then current trends in Western thought, and on 
his return to Japan, he brought back William James’s idea of pure experi-
ence and conveyed this to his friend, the philosopher Nishida Kitarō.14 
Nishida then employed the concept of pure experience ( junsui keiken 
純粋經驗) as the foundation for his first book, Zen no kenkyū 善の研究 (A 
Study of the Good).15 In that book, Nishida says, “By pure I am referring 
to that state of experience just as it is without the least addition of delibera-
tive discrimination.”16 Pure experience is pure in the sense that it contains no 
intellectual discrimination, no dualistic conceptualization. Sharf says that, in 
philosophical terms, this is what Suzuki meant by satori.17 Thus, he concludes 
that D. T. Suzuki’s exposition of Zen and satori, “with its unrelenting empha-
sis on an unmediated inner experience, is not derived from Buddhist sources 
so much as from his broad familiarity with European and American philo-
sophical and religious writings.”18 On this account, Suzuki’s concept of satori 
is not originally derived from traditional Buddhism. It has an American origin.
Did Monks Meditate for Enlightenment? 
Contrary to the picture painted for us by D. T. Suzuki, Sharf denies that 
traditional Chan/Zen practice was directed toward the attainment of an 
enlightenment experience: “In point of fact, traditional Ch’an and Zen prac-
tice was oriented not towards engendering ‘enlightenment’ experiences, but 
rather to perfecting the ritual performance of Buddhahood. . . . The mod-
ern notion that Ch’an and Zen monks were required to experience satori 
before they could ‘inherit the dharma’ is simply inaccurate.”19 Similarly he 
says that our image of Buddhist monks leading lives centered on medita-
tion practice is also mistaken. “In fact, contrary to the image propagated 
by twentieth-century apologists, the actual practice of what we would call 
meditation rarely played a major role in Buddhist monastic life.”20 
14 Sharf 1993, p. 22.
15 Nishida 1911. For an English translation, see Nishida 1990.
16 Nishida 1990, p. 3.
17 Sharf 1993, pp. 21–23.
18 Sharf 1998, p. 101.
19 Sharf 1995a, p. 243.
20 Sharf 1995a, p. 241; see also Sharf 1998, p. 99.
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What is the evidence for these assertions? In support of these claims, 
Sharf marshals several arguments. First, he claims that the key Japanese 
terms for experience, keiken 經驗 and taiken 體驗, are rarely found in pre-
modern Japanese texts and that they only start to be used in the early Meiji 
period.21 A second argument concerns mārga texts, texts outlining the path 
of practice. Here Sharf’s critique of Zen broadens to include Buddhism in 
general. Mārga texts are often taken to be guidebooks through the stages 
of consciousness that a practitioner encounters when advancing into deeper 
and deeper meditation. But Sharf argues that they are not based on the per-
sonal experiences which a master practitioner has had during meditation. 
Mārga texts are “first and foremost scholastic compendiums, compiled 
by monks of formidable learning who were attempting to systematize and 
schematize the confused and often conflicting descriptions of practices 
and stages found scattered throughout the canon.”22 When unusual states 
of consciousness do get mentioned in these texts, they turn out to be the 
kind which modern people cannot accept: “They are filled with detailed 
accounts of the supernatural attainments (siddhi) that accompany particular 
meditative trances, including such powers as walking through walls, flying 
through the air, becoming invisible, reading minds, recalling past lives, and 
so on.”23 
A third argument introduces a theory of language that similarly applies 
not just to Chan/Zen but to all of Buddhism. Sharf says the vocabulary of 
meditation and experience in Buddhism—śamatha, vipassanā, sotāpatti, 
satori, etc.—does not actually refer to or denote states of consciousness. If 
it did, then one could expect that meditation teachers would agree on what 
these terms labelled. But “the lack of consensus among prominent Buddhist 
teachers as to the designation not only of particular states of consciousness, 
but also of the psychotropic techniques used to produce them (e.g., śamatha 
versus vipassanā) belies the notion that the rhetoric of Buddhist meditative 
experience functions ostensively.”24 That is, words for states of conscious-
ness in Buddhism do not get their sense by referring to “experiences.” Such 
vocabulary does not “function ostensively.”25 When people use such lan-
guage, what are they doing? Sharf seems to be saying we need to shift our 
attention away from the content of the language toward its function or its 
21 Sharf 1993, pp. 21–22; 1998, p. 102.
22 Sharf 1995a, p. 238.
23 Sharf 1995a, p. 238. 
24 Sharf 1995a, p. 265.
25 Sharf 1995a, p. 228; see also Sharf 1998, p. 103.
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performance. He finds “such discourse turns out to function ideologically 
and performatively—wielded more often than not in the interests of legiti-
mation and institutional authority.”26 Sharf’s comments about language, 
contrasting ostensive meaning with ideological performance, recalls Witt-
genstein’s private language argument.27 Unfortunately there is not enough 
space here to give this topic the attention it deserves.
Suzuki’s account of Zen practice as founded on the experience of satori 
is, says Sharf, an “invented tradition,” inspired by William James’s con-
cept of pure experience. But the evidence he has adduced so far—that the 
terms keiken and taiken do not appear in classical texts, mārga texts are not 
accounts of personal experience, the Buddhist vocabulary for personal expe-
rience is not used “ostensively”—is indirect circumstantial evidence, so to 
speak. Is there no more direct evidence for judging whether the Chan/Zen 
tradition is founded on the notion of satori? Is the satori experience part of an 
invented tradition, or is it part of the historical tradition itself? Instead of pro-
viding more direct evidence, Sharf moves to putting forth an alternate theory. 
Enlightenment: Experience or Ritual?
Where Suzuki talks of Zen enlightenment as a sudden experience, Sharf 
offers an account of enlightenment as ritual performance. That is, when 
traditional Chan texts speak of enlightenment, these texts are not thinking 
of enlightenment as the attainment of a state of consciousness, or “phenom-
enological” experience.
One searches in vain for a premodern Chinese or Japanese 
equivalent to the phenomenological notion of “experience.” Nor 
is it legitimate to interpret such technical Zen terms as satori (to 
understand) or kenshō (to see one’s original nature) as denoting 
some species of unmediated experience in the sense of Nishida’s 
junsui keiken. In traditional Chinese Buddhist literature such 
terms are used to denote the full comprehension and apprecia-
tion of central Buddhist tenets such as śūnyatā, Buddha-nature, 
or dependent origination. There are simply no a priori grounds to 
conceive of such moments of insight in phenomenological terms. 
Indeed, Chinese Buddhist commentators in general, and Ch’an 
26 Sharf 1995a, p. 228; see also Sharf 1998 pp. 96, 103.
27 The “private language” argument centers on §§244–71 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Phil-
osophical Investigations. 
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exegetes in particular, tend to be antipathetic to any form of phe-
nomenological reduction.28
That is to say, when traditional Chan texts say of someone that he is 
enlightened, it does not mean that he had a sudden flash of insight, or was 
consumed by the experience of nirvana, or for a moment experienced the 
emptiness of all phenomenal existence. This way of thinking about enlight-
enment is “phenomenological reduction” and it is a mistake. Rather, to say 
of a person that he is enlightened is to say that he has mastered the ritual of 
acting like a Buddha. 
In a Chinese Ch’an monastery, the abbot was treated as if he were 
the Buddha himself. The abbot’s primary religious duty consists 
in ritually enacting the role of Buddha. Indeed, according to 
Ch’an tradition the central Buddha icon in the Buddha Hall—
the focal point of Chinese Buddhist monastic ritual—came to be 
replaced in Ch’an monasteries by the living person of the abbot, 
thereby obviating the need for a Buddha Hall altogether.29 
In addition to the abbot himself, the monks under him were ritually trained 
to act as if they were in the presence of the Buddha himself.30 The duties 
of the abbot were many and were prescribed in great detail. Chief among 
them was “ascending the hall” (Ch. shangtang 上堂; Jp. jōdō) and giving a 
lecture. The entire event was highly choreographed. The lecture itself was 
given in the Chan style of language with its numerous rhetorical conven-
tions and although completely scripted, it was taken as the spontaneous 
utterance of a Buddha.31 A monk candidate for abbot had to train for many 
years studying Buddhist texts, mastering the rhetorical style of Chan dis-
course, rehearsing the performance of the many rituals, and so on. It is for 
this reason that enlightenment cannot be thought of as a single event, a reli-
gious experience.
Years of rigorous training and rehearsal were necessary to master 
the repertoire before one could do a flawless rendering of enlight-
ened discourse. . . . Thus, the goal of Chan monastic practice can-
not be reduced to some private “inner transformation” or “mystical 
28 Sharf 1993, p. 22.
29 Sharf 1992, p. 6.
30 Sharf 2005, p. 263.
31 Sharf 2005, pp. 265–66; 1992, pp. 6–7. 
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experience.” It lies rather in the practical mastery of buddha-
hood—the ability to execute, day in and day out, a compelling 
rendition of liberated action and speech, and to pass that mastery 
on to one’s disciples.32 
In other words, in Sharf’s explanation, to say that a person is enlightened is 
to say that he has mastered the ritual of “being enlightened.”
Enlightenment is not so much a “state of mind” as a form of 
knowledge and mode of activity, acquired through a long and 
arduous course of physical discipline and study. Advancement 
within the ecclesiastical hierarchy is not associated with fleet-
ing moments of insight or transformative personal experiences 
so much as with vocational maturity—one’s ability to publicly 
instantiate or model liberation. In short, while notions such as 
satori and kenshō may play an important role in the mythology 
and ideology of Zen, their role in the day-to-day training of Zen 
monks is not as central as some contemporary writings might lead 
one to believe.33 
These are the two halves of Sharf’s position, the first half critiquing the 
current concept of satori or enlightenment as a religious experience, and the 
second half advancing the claim that enlightenment is the mastery of ritual 
behavior. It is time now to evaluate these claims.
Enlightenment in Premodern Texts 
First, is enlightenment a “phenomenological” experience? What distinc-
tion is there between enlightenment conceived phenomenologically and 
enlightenment conceived as ritual mastery? One feature of enlightenment 
conceived as a phenomenological experience is that it is an event, an occur-
rence. An event happens on a certain day and at a certain time; it has a 
beginning, lasts for a certain amount of time, and then ends. In contrast, 
enlightenment conceived as vocational maturity, the full comprehension of 
central Buddhist tenets and mastery of Buddhist ritual, is not an event. It 
does not happen all at once on a certain day at a certain hour. If one could 
measure the amount of time a person spends attaining ritual maturity, it 
would be measured in years and there would probably be no precisely 
32 Sharf 2005, p. 266.
33 Sharf 1995b, p. 418.  
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defined starting point or end point. Typically, reaching full maturity in any 
discipline happens so gradually that one speaks of it not so much as an 
event but as a process. This is one signal difference between enlightenment 
conceived as a phenomenological experience (event) and enlightenment 
conceived of as ritual maturity (process). Of course, there are other differ-
ences between these two conceptions of enlightenment but this distinction 
between event and process is all we need for the moment.34 
Our question can now be reframed: In traditional Chinese Buddhist liter-
ature, is enlightenment depicted as an event (phenomenological experience) 
or as a process (ritual maturity)? What is the “traditional” way in which 
enlightenment is depicted—event or process? The answer to this question 
will help us answer the larger question: Is D. T. Suzuki’s way of depicting 
enlightenment an “invention of tradition”? 
With the compilation of the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Associa-
tion (CBETA) database which contains the entire Taishō daizōkyō (T) and 
the Zoku zōkyō (ZZ) canons, it is now possible to conduct searches for the 
terms used to refer to Zen enlightenment in classical texts. For these terms, 
I conducted two kinds of searches on the CBETA database, one “open 
search” covering the entire Taishō daizōkyō and Zoku zōkyō canons, and 
one “restricted search” where the search field was limited to Chan materi-
als (Ch. Chanzong bulei 禪宗部類).35 First, we can comment on the point 
raised by Sharf about the Japanese terms for “experience,” keiken and tai-
ken. Our searches showed that although these terms do occur, they occur 
infrequently and hardly at all in Chan/Zen texts (see table 1). 
34 The distinction between “event” and “process” is not a hard ontological distinction. 
It is a “common sense” distinction reflected in language. That is all that is required for the 
present argument. 
35 See CBETA 中華電子佛典協會 (Chinese Buddhist Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection). 
http://www.cbeta.org/. 
tranSlation
cHineSe 
cHaracterS PronunciationS
no. HitS 
oPen 
SearcH
no. HitS 
reStricted 
 SearcH
“experience” 經驗 Ch. jing yan; Jp. keiken 61 15
“experience” 體驗 Ch. tiyan; Jp. taiken 21 9
Table 1. Instances of keiken and taiken.
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So Sharf is quite right in his claim that these terms for “experience” do 
not occur frequently in traditional Chan literature.
But what does this fact prove? It does not prove that there is no phenom-
enological conception of “experience” in classical Chan texts. It is not to be 
expected that modern philosophical terminology should occur in premodern 
classical literature; it is not to be expected that Chan texts from, for exam-
ple, the Tang and Song periods (seventh to thirteenth centuries) should use 
the modern twentieth- and twenty-first century philosophical terminology 
for “experience.” Chan texts from the Tang and Song periods had their own 
vocabulary for talking about awakening or enlightenment. The common 
character for Zen awakening or enlightenment in early Chan texts is wu 悟. 
This is pronounced in Japanese either as “satori” as a standalone word, or 
as go in compounds. The character occurs in a great variety of expressions, 
and searches on the CBETA database show that these expressions occur 
many times in early Chan texts. Table 2 shows the number of hits for sev-
eral expressions containing this character.
In these expressions, wu is treated “phenomenologically,” that is, as 
an event and not as a ritual process. In the term “sudden awakening,” for 
example, the adjective “sudden” 頓 (Ch. dun 頓; Jp. ton) clearly indicates 
an event and not a process extended over a period of time. In the other 
expressions, the adjective and adverb modifiers make it clear that the phrase 
describes an event and not a process. Wu happens “suddenly”; it is triggered 
“at this” or “at these words.” It happens “at once.” In these contexts, it is 
implausible to think that wu refers to mastery of ritual performance. One 
cannot naturally say “suddenly he had great ritual maturity.” 
There are other expressions which do not use the character wu but which 
in context imply that the person had an awakening experience, for example 
the word for “insight” or “realization,” xing 省 (Jp. shō or sei; see table 3).
One might argue that “had insight” 有省 is a word with a broad mean-
ing and does not necessarily refer to an event, the moment of Zen enlight-
enment, in every case. Indeed, there are probably instances where “had 
insight” could be given a ritualist interpretation, but there are many 
instances where “had insight” must be given an event interpretation. For 
example, this phrase is used in one of the classic accounts of Zen awak-
ening. In this story, Deshan 德山 (Jp. Tokusan; 782–865), the scholar of 
the Diamond Sutra, has just been humiliated by an old woman selling tea 
snacks; she had asked him a question he could not answer. Following her 
instructions, he sought out Longtan 龍潭 (Jp. Ryūtan; n.d.). He spoke with 
Longtan for a long time and when he went to leave, it was already dark. 
H O R I :  S U Z U K I  A N D  T H E  I N V E N T I O N  O F  T R A D I T I O N 51
tranSlation
cHineSe 
cHaracterS PronunciationS
no. HitS 
oPen 
SearcH
no. HitS 
reStricted 
SearcH
“sudden 
awakening”
頓悟 Ch. dunwu; Jp. tongo 3,114 930
“at once he was 
awakened”
忽悟 Ch. hu wu; Jp. 
tachimachi go su
280 128
“at once he was 
awakened”
忽然悟 Ch. huran wu; Jp. 
kotsunen ni go su
49 40
“he was vastly 
awakened”
豁然悟 Ch. huoran wu;
Jp. katsuzen ni go su
95 28
“at this he was 
awakened”
於此悟 Ch. yuci wu; Jp. kore ni 
oite go su
102 47
“at these 
words, he was 
awakened”
於言下悟 Ch. yuyanxia wu;
Jp. gonka ni oite go su
37 22
“at once he 
was greatly 
awakened”
忽大悟 Ch. hu dawu; Jp. ta-
chimachi daigo su
270 57
“at once he had 
an awakening”
當下悟 Ch. dangxia wu; Jp. 
tōka go su
19 19
“at once he 
was greatly 
awakened”
忽然大悟 Ch. huran dawu; Jp. 
kotsunen ni daigo su
251 243
“he had a great 
vast awakening”
豁然大悟 Ch. huoran dawu; Jp. 
katsuzen ni daigo su
584 288
“at once he 
had certain 
awakening”
忽然領悟 Ch. huran lingwu; Jp. 
kotsunen ni ryōgo su
7 5
“at this he 
was greatly 
awakened”
於此大悟 Ch. yuci dawu; Jp. kore 
ni oite daigo su
71 51
“at these words, 
he was greatly 
awakened”
於言下大悟 Ch. yuyanxia dawu; Jp. 
gonka ni oite daigo su
497 294
“at these words, 
he had a sudden 
awakening”
於言下頓悟 Ch. yu yanxia dunwu; 
Jp. gonka ni oite tongo 
su
71 25
“at once he 
had a great 
awakening”
當下大悟 Ch. dangxia dawu; Jp. 
tōka daigo su
73 47
total HitS 5,520 2,224
Table 2. Phrases with the term wu.
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Longtan lit a paper lantern and gave it to Deshan. When Deshan took it and 
turned to go outside, Longtan blew out the lantern. Deshan suddenly had 
an insight (Ch. huran you xing 忽然有省; Jp. kotsunen ni shō [sei] ari).36 
A search for you xing 有省, “he had an insight,” restricted to Chan materi-
als yields 1,446 hits. In some of these hits, it is possible the phrase is used to 
mean the monk “had ritual maturity” and could enact the role of Buddha. It 
would be necessary to examine each instance of use to decide this. But as the 
story of Deshan and Longtan makes clear, “he had an insight” ( you xing) was 
certainly used “phenomenologically” to mean awakening as a sudden event.
There are several more expressions which do not literally mean “he was 
enlightened,” but which can certainly have that meaning in a particular con-
text (see table 4).
These miscellaneous expressions are all similar in that they do not liter-
ally say “he experienced enlightenment.” But they are often used in con-
texts which clearly imply the attainment of a sudden enlightenment. For 
example, the term, “attain the way” (a possible candidate for the ritualist 
interpretation of enlightenment) in case 22 of the Blue Cliff Record (Ch. 
Biyan lu 碧巌録; Jp. Hekiganroku) refers to the moment of awakening. 
36 See case no. 28 of the Wumen guan 無門關 (Jp. Mumon kan; hereafter, Gateless Gate), 
and case no. 4 of the Foguo yuanwu chanshi biyan lu 佛果圓悟禪師碧巖錄 (Jp. Bukka engo 
zenji hekiganroku; Blue Cliff Record of Chan Master Foguo Yuanwu, hereafter Blue Cliff 
Record). See, respectively, T no. 2005, 48: 296b20–c16, and T no. 2003, 48: 143b4–144c24.
tranSlation
cHineSe 
cHaracterS PronunciationS
no. HitS 
oPen 
SearcH
no. HitS 
reStricted 
SearcH
“he had an 
insight” 有省
Ch. you xing; 
Jp. shō[sei] ari
3,380 1,446
“suddenly he had 
an insight” 忽有省
Ch. hu you xing;
Jp. tachimachi shō 
[sei] ari 
282 20
“suddenly he had 
an insight” 忽然有省
Ch. huran you xing; 
Jp. kotsunen ni shō 
[sei] ari
117 63
“then he had an 
insight” 便省
Ch. bian xing
Jp. sunawachi satoru
28 22
total HitS 3,807 1,651
Table 3. Phrases with the term xing.
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There, the Chinese sentence “今日始是鰲山成道 jinri shi shi an shan cheng 
dao”37 is literally translated, “Today on Tortoise Mountain, I’ve finally 
attained the Way,” but note that Cleary translates it, “Today on Tortoise 
Mountain I’ve finally achieved enlightenment,” as if it were an event.38 For 
the expression “straightway he broke through,” (Ch. maran dapo 驀然打破; 
Jp. bakuzen ni taha su), see the letter that Gaofeng Yuanmiao 高峰原妙 (Jp. 
Kōhō Genmyō; 1238–1295) wrote to his master, which clearly describes a 
sudden event in consciousness and not the gradual ripening of ritual maturity. 
In the middle of the second month, I returned to the [monk’s] 
hall. In the following month on the night of the sixteenth, I was 
37 T no. 2003, 48: 145a19.
38 Cleary 1998, p. 127.
tranSlation
cHineSe 
cHaracterS PronunciationS
no. HitS
oPen 
SearcH
no. HitS 
reStricted 
SearcH
“attain the Way” 成道 Ch. chengdao;
Jp. jōdō
7,709 1,279
“straightway he 
broke through”
驀然打破 Ch. maran dapo; 
Jp. bakuzen ni taha su
29 25
“break through 
the bottom of the 
bucket”
桶底脱 Ch. tongdituo;
Jp. tōteidatsu
106 95
“suddenly he 
understood”
豁然領解 Ch. huoran lingjie; 
Jp. katsuzen ni ryōkai
11 1
“he illuminated 
the great matter 
right under his 
feet”
明脚跟下大事 Ch. ming jiaogenxia 
dashi;
Jp. kyakkonka no daiji 
o akasu
1 1
“at these words 
he attained great 
freedom”
於言下得大自在 Ch. yuyanxia de dazi-
zai;
Jp. gonka ni oite daiji-
zai o etari
1 1
“got it” 體得 Ch. tide;
Jp. taitoku
576 160
total HitS 8,433 1,562
Table 4. Other phrases. 
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deep in sleep when suddenly I recalled the question Master 
Duanqiao raised in his room, “The ten thousand things return to 
one. What does one return to?” From this, a feeling of doubt sud-
denly arose and consumed me. Immediately I became unable to 
distinguish east from west. I completely forgot about eating and 
sleeping. Six days I passed like this until one morning, as I was 
walking down a corridor, just then the assembled monks came 
out of the monk’s hall; without thinking, I joined them. On arriv-
ing at the Pavilion of the Three Stupas, we chanted sutras. Sud-
denly I saw the mounted verse dedicated to Master Wuzu Fayan, 
the last two lines of which read, “In a hundred years, there are 
36,000 mornings; fundamentally all that leaves and returns is this 
fellow here.” Previously I had been asked by the Master, “Who 
drags this corpse around?” Straightway I broke through. At once 
my spirit flew off leaving my flesh to mourn, and completely 
exhausted I was reborn. It was just as if I had put down a one-
hundred-twenty-pound carrying pole.39
The expression “suddenly he understood” (Ch. huoran lingjie 豁然領解; Jp. 
katsuzen ni ryōkai su) again need not always refer to a “phenomenological” 
Zen enlightenment experience but in case 19 of the Blue Cliff Record, it 
definitely does.40 Whenever Master Juzhi 倶胝 (Jp. Gutei; n.d.) was asked 
anything, he would always just raise one finger. When his servant boy was 
asked what his master taught, the boy just raised one finger. On learning of 
this, Master Juzhi cut off the servant boy’s finger with a knife. As the boy 
ran away screaming, Master Juzhi called to him. When the boy looked back, 
Master Juzhi raised his finger and the boy suddenly understood (huoran 
lingjie). Here “understood” clearly is meant to imply that the boy had an 
understanding as a sudden event; it certainly does not mean that he attained 
ritual maturity and could thus enact the role of an abbot in a monastery. 
Finally, the term taitoku 體得 (Ch. tide) has been included in this list 
because, according to the late centenarian Zen teacher, Sasaki Jōshū Rōshi, 
39 二月半歸堂。忽於次月十六夜夢中。忽憶斷橋和尚室中所舉萬法歸一一歸何處話。自
此疑情頓發。打成一片。直得東西不辨。寢食俱忘。至第六日辰巳間。在廊下行。見眾僧堂
內出。不覺輥於隊中。至三塔閣上諷經。擡頭忽覩五祖演和尚真贊。末後兩句云。百年三萬
六千朝。返覆元來是遮漢。日前被老和尚所問拖死屍句子。驀然打破。直得魂飛膽喪。絕
後再甦。何啻如放下百二十斤擔子. Gaofeng Yuanmiao chanshi yulu 高峰原妙禪師語錄 (Jp. 
Kōhō Genmyō zenji goroku; Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Gaofeng Yuanmiao) (italics 
added); ZZ no. 1400, 70: 690b8–15. 
40 For this case, see T no. 2003, 48: 154c2–155a20.
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the common word for Zen experience in Japanese Rinzai monasteries prior 
to the war was not taiken or keiken, but taitoku.41 Taitoku is a compound 
of tai “body” and toku “acquire, master, make one’s own.” As the CBETA 
search indicates, there are numerous occurrences of this term, thus showing 
that modern Zen practice discourse shares some vocabulary with classical 
Chan/Zen texts. Taiken and keiken may not be part of the Chan/Zen tradi-
tional vocabulary, but taitoku is.
One term which lends itself to a process interpretation is the term kenshō 
見性 (Ch. jianxing), “see one’s nature.” This term occurs very frequently, as 
the numbers in table 5 indicate. 
Many occurrences of this term occur inside the set phrase “point directly at 
the human mind, see one’s nature, and become Buddha” (Ch. zhizhi renxin 
jianxing chengfo 直指人心見性成佛; Jp. jikishi ninshin kenshō jōbutsu). It 
may be used in such a general way that it is open to a process interpretation. 
More detailed analysis of individual cases would be required to determine 
if this is so. 
To call a practice an “invented tradition” is to imply that it was recently 
created but that people falsely claim it to be ancient. This CBETA survey 
shows that D. T. Suzuki’s conception of satori as a sudden experience has 
not been recently invented or manufactured. Although the modern philo-
sophical terminology of taiken and keiken is not used in traditional Chan 
literature, the character wu, read go or satori in Japanese, is used to refer to 
awakening as a sudden event. There are literally hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of instances where someone is described as suddenly experiencing 
enlightenment. This is the “traditional” way of conceiving of enlightenment 
in Chan/Zen. D. T. Suzuki did not invent that tradition. 
41 In lectures during the December rōhatsu sesshin 臘八接心, 1997, at Mount Baldy, Cali-
fornia. 
tranSlation
cHineSe 
cHaracterS PronunciationS
no. HitS 
oPen 
SearcH
no. HitS 
reStricted 
SearcH
“see one’s 
nature”
見性
Ch. jianxing;
Jp. kenshō
7,553 1,993
Table 5. Instances of the term kenshō.
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Ineffable and Inconceivable
Let us now take up the thorny issue of satori as pure experience. Nishida 
explained it as “that state of experience just as it is without the least 
addition of deliberative discrimination.”42 I do not want to debate whether 
Zen awakening is non-conceptual or whether the idea of a non-conceptual 
experience is an intelligible idea.43 In this section, even though I think the 
very idea of a non-conceptual experience is highly problematic, I do want to 
argue that many Buddhist texts did indeed think of the experience of awaken-
ing as ineffable and inconceivable, that to depict awakening as ineffable and 
inconceivable is not “invented tradition,” but the historical “tradition” itself. 
In Sharf’s explanation, satori is characterized as ineffable and inconceiv-
able in order for it to play its strategic and ideological role. In stressing the 
strategic and ideological function of religious experience here, Sharf is fol-
lowing Wayne Proudfoot whose research into religious experience is less 
concerned with the content of religious experience and more concerned 
with the fact that the concept can be deployed ideologically to confer 
authority and legitimacy on those who have it and to refuse it to others.44 
When Suzuki stressed the essential role of satori in Zen, he was joining 
the company of Western scholars like Friedrich Schleiermacher and Rudolf 
Otto who had argued that experience—not metaphysical doctrine, not eccle-
siastical institution—was the core of religion.45 The concept of religious 
experience provided men like Schleiermacher and Otto with a “protective 
strategy,”46 an “exegetical strategy,”47 to defend religion from secular criti-
cism. They could argue that only a person who had had religious experience 
had the authority to speak about religion; those who had no religious experi-
ence ipso facto had no knowledge of what religion was and therefore lacked 
the necessary credentials to criticize it.48 In this ideological analysis, the con-
cept of religious experience prima facie looks as if it is distinguishing a state 
of consciousness; in fact, it uses the language of consciousness politically to 
distinguish groups of people, empowering some and disempowering others.
42 Nishida 1987, p. 3. Nishida footnotes William James, but he also footnotes several 
other scholars on “immediate experience,” notably Wilhelm Wundt, Stout, and Schopen-
hauer (Nishida 1990, pp. 3–10). 
43 See my discussion in Hori 2000.
44 Proudfoot 1985; Sharf 1995a, pp. 229–31.
45 Sharf 1993, p. 21.
46 Proudfoot 1985, pp. 199–209.
47 Sharf 1995a, p. 229.
48 Sharf 1995a, p. 229.
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Applied to Zen, this argument meant that “only those privy to a legitimate 
kenshō experience are qualified to speak of Zen.”49 Just as Rudolph Otto 
used to say that the reader who lacked the personal experience of numinous 
religion “is requested to read no further,”50 so also Suzuki’s account of Zen 
awakening implied that only one who had experienced satori had the right 
to speak about it. 
A reader of Sharf’s argument gets the impression that D. T. Suzuki 
turned William James’s idea of pure consciousness into Zen satori in order 
to manipulate the feature of ineffability for political purposes. However, 
Suzuki was following a long-established tradition that described the Bud-
dha’s awakening as ineffable, indescribable, and thus impossible to con-
vey to another person in language. The Ariyapariyesana Sutta (Majjhima 
Nikaya 26) depicts the Buddha himself reflecting after his awakening 
experience, “This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard 
to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-
experienced by the wise. . . . And if I were to teach the Dhamma and others 
would not understand me, that would be tiresome for me, troublesome for 
me.”51 The “Skillful Means” chapter of the Lotus Sutra similarly shows the 
Buddha wondering how to teach to sentient beings the enlightenment he has 
attained. He says: 
It is impossible to explain this Dharma;
The powers of speech fail.
No other sentient being is able to understand it,
Except for those bodhisattvas 
Who, in their belief, are willing to understand. 
Even the multitude of the Buddha’s disciples, 
Who have formerly paid homage to all the Buddhas, 
Who have put an end to all their corruption 
And are bearing their last bodies, 
Are not able to understand it. 
Even if this whole world 
Were filled with those such as Śāriputra, 
And they tried together to comprehend it, 
49 Sharf 1993, pp. 25–26.
50 Otto 1923, p. 8.
51 “Ariyapariyesana Sutta: The Noble Search.” Translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. 2004. 
Access to Insight: Readings in Theravāda Buddhism. Barre Center for Buddhist Studies. 
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.026.than.html. 
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They still would not be able to understand completely 
The wisdom of the Buddhas.52 
The Avataṃsaka Sutra begins with the Buddha surrounded by numerous 
enlightened beings who in verse describe the Buddha, the Buddha’s body, the 
Buddha’s compassion, the Buddha’s teachings, the Buddha’s light, the Bud-
dha’s enlightenment as boundless, sublime, supreme, inexhaustible, infinite, 
and inconceivable. The celestial king Ocean of Subtle Flames says, “The Bud-
dha is inconceivable, beyond discrimination, / Comprehending forms every-
where as insubstantial.”53 The celestial king Banner of the Delightful Light 
of Truth says, “The realm of the buddhas is inconceivable: no sentient being 
can fathom it.”54 The herb spirit Auspicious says, “The Buddha’s knowledge 
is inconceivable— / He knows the minds of all sentient beings, / And by the 
power of various techniques, / Destroys their delusions and infinite pains.”55 
Sanctuary spirit Banner of Pure Adornments says, “Everything at the site of 
enlightenment produces exquisite sound / Extolling the pure, inconceivable 
powers of the Buddha / As well as the perfected causal practices: this can be 
heard by Ineffable Light.”56 In numerous places in the Buddhist tradition, the 
Buddha’s enlightenment is described as inconceivable and ineffable. 
Sharf claims that D. T. Suzuki’s exposition of Zen and satori, “with its 
unrelenting emphasis on an unmediated inner experience, is not derived 
from Buddhist sources so much as from his broad familiarity with Euro-
pean and American philosophical and religious writings.”57 This claim is 
implausible. The idea of religious experience has been around for a long 
time. Suzuki may have learned about James’s notion of “pure experience,” 
but the idea that the Buddha’s enlightenment is ineffable and inconceivable 
is the standard position of Buddhism throughout its history. Buddhist texts 
talked of the Buddha’s experience as ineffable long before James coined the 
term “pure experience.” Rather than claim that Suzuki’s concept of satori 
was modelled on James’s notion of pure experience, it is more plausible to 
claim that James modeled his concept of pure experience on older concep-
tions of the ineffability of religious experience. 
52 Kubo and Yuyama 1993, pp. 28–29.
53 Cleary 1993, p. 65.
54 Cleary 1993, p. 66.
55 Cleary 1993, p. 115.
56 Cleary 1993, p. 125.
57 Sharf 1998, p. 101.
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Inventing Tradition and the Koan 
The concept of satori was fundamental to Suzuki’s exposition of Zen, but 
equally important to his exposition was the Zen koan. In fact, Suzuki intro-
duced the Zen koan to the Western world. His account of satori is tightly 
intertwined with his account of the koan practice. The koan is a device 
to lead a Zen practitioner to the experience of satori. “Without the koan 
the Zen consciousness loses its pointer, and there will never be a state 
of satori.”58 Satori and koan are not two independent topics in Suzuki’s 
account. If Sharf maintains that the concept of satori is an invented tradition 
created by Suzuki, does that mean that his account of the koan practice tra-
dition is also invented? 
The koan originated, Suzuki mused, as a way of teaching Zen. The early 
Chan masters during the Tang period in China each had their own individual 
methods to evoke the awakening of Zen. To preserve their wisdom and to 
teach it to later generations, some of the mondō 問答 (Ch. wenda) dialogues 
of the old masters were selected for use as example cases.59 When the mondō 
came to be used as a teaching device, it became a koan. Inevitably, the disciple 
who received one of these koan at first attempted to understand it intellectu-
ally, but “there is no room in the koan to insert an intellectual interpretation.”60 
Nevertheless, the master advised the disciple to keep his mind constantly fixed 
on the koan, never wavering day or night. “The time will come when your 
mind will suddenly come to a stop like an old rat who finds himself in a cul-de-
sac. Then there will be a plunging into the unknown with the cry, ‘Ah, this!’”61 
Struggling with the koan in this way, one fell into satori. 
Whatever the origin, a koan-based teaching tradition did get created 
and transmitted down through the centuries. Because of this koan teach-
ing tradition, a body of texts came into being—koan collections such as 
the twelfth-century Blue Cliff Record, the thirteenth-century Gateless Gate, 
and in Japan, the seventeenth-century Shūmon kattōshū 葛藤集 (Entangling 
Vines).62 There were others. In modern Rinzai monasteries in Japan today, 
and in Rinzai-influenced Zen centers in the West, Zen masters still teach the 
koan from these texts. Suzuki pointed out that though a thousand years had 
passed, Hakuin 白隱 (1686–1769) in Japan still taught the Zen of Huineng 
58 Suzuki (1933) 1970, p. 95.
59 Suzuki (1933) 1970, p. 95.
60 Suzuki (1933) 1970, p. 96.
61 Suzuki (1933) 1970, p. 102.
62 For the original, see Dōmae 2010. For an English translation, see Kirchner 2013.
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慧能 (Jp. Enō; 638–713).63 When Suzuki was still a student in university he 
commuted from Tokyo to the monastery of Engakuji in Kamakura in order 
to sit in zazen and wrestle with the koan. 
In contemporary Rinzai Zen monastic koan training, is awakening treated 
phenomenologically or is it treated as ritual maturity? As Sharf says, “The 
most compelling arguments are not theoretical, but rather ethnographic.”64 
What is the ethnographic evidence? So far as I know, no anthropologist 
from the Western academy has conducted participant-observer research or 
done any kind of anthropological fieldwork on a Rinzai Zen monastery in 
Japan. But here I can report on actual practice in a Rinzai Zen monastery as 
I have spent thirteen years in Rinzai koan practice. I was an unsui 雲水—
a Zen monk—between the years 1977 and 1990 at the Daitokuji Sōdō 大徳
寺僧堂 in Kyoto, the Entsūji Sōdō 圓通寺僧堂 in Imari, and the Nagaoka 
Zenjuku 長岡禅塾 in Nagaoka, Japan. Here an “objective” academic theo-
rist may complain that since I was a Zen koan practitioner, my testimony is 
subjectively biased and not to be trusted. I will have more to say about such 
a move to silence the practitioner. In the meanwhile, I will report on con-
temporary Rinzai koan practice as I have seen it.
Sharf writes, “The kōan genre, far from serving as a means to obviate 
reason, is a highly sophisticated form of scriptural exegesis: the manipula-
tion or ‘solution’ of a particular kōan traditionally demanded an extensive 
knowledge of canonical Buddhist doctrine and classical Zen literature.”65 
In the monastery where I began koan practice, first-year monks were given 
their shokan 初關, “first barrier” koan—“Sound of One Hand,” or “Jōshū’s 
Mu”—and then instructed to focus their attention on it during meditation. 
The majority of these monks had little previous zazen experience before 
entering the monastery. And while some had majored in Buddhist studies 
in college, many had no significant intellectual background in Buddhist 
scripture (myself included). During their sanzen 参禪 meetings with the 
rōshi 老師, the monks received one basic instruction about how to meditate 
with koan: it is futile to try to intellectually understand the koan; instead, 
to see a koan (koan o miru 公案を見流), you must “become one” with the 
koan. “Become one with . . .” (narikiru 成り切る) is the core instruction with 
several variant expressions in language: “to become one piece with . . .” (ichi 
mai to naru 一枚となる); “to become the thing itself ” (sono mono to naru 
63 Suzuki (1933) 1970, p. 107.
64 Sharf 1995a, p. 260.
65 Sharf 1993, p. 2.
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そのものとなる); “to wrestle and fuse with . . . ” (torikunde gappei suru 
取り組んでいる合併する), and so on. The monk sees the koan not through 
intellectually understanding it but through the constant repeated effort to 
narikiru, to become one with it. He constantly repeats and poses to himself 
the question of the koan: “What is the sound of one hand?” until he finally 
fuses with the koan and becomes “the sound of one hand.” He constantly 
repeats “mu” to himself until he finally becomes a ball of mu (mu no katamari 
無の塊) itself. This is the core experience a monk needs to see a koan. The 
monk does not need “an extensive knowledge of canonical Buddhist doc-
trine and classical Zen literature.”
Is the passing of the koan a “phenomenological experience”? Or is it 
the mastery of ritualized behaviour? This is not an either/or issue. The Zen 
monastery is a unique institution because it cultivates a nonrational insight 
through ritual formalism. I have discussed this elsewhere.66 Many entering 
monks know through hearsay that the proper response to the “Mu” koan is 
to utter “mu” in a loud voice and the proper response to the koan “Sound of 
One Hand” is to thrust forward one hand and utter “sekishu” 隻手 (“sound 
of one hand”) in a loud voice. But the monk who treats his response as just 
a pro forma ritual is surprised to find that he does not pass. I remember a 
conversation with a first-year monk who told me that whenever he pre-
sented the ritual answer to “Mu,” the rōshi merely said “Hai” and rang the 
bell to dismiss him. As with all the other monks before him, this monk will 
be driven to try other answers—slapping the tatami, standing and shout-
ing, laughing and crying, and so on—until after weeks and months, perhaps 
years, finally at his wit’s end, totally confused and desperate to see some 
light, he throws everything away and shouts with every ounce of strength 
“mu!” Although in ritual form he is still giving a great shout, for the first 
time he does it without self-consciousness, throwing himself completely 
into his action. It is at once a moment of rote repetition and a moment of 
totally concentrated consciousness. In ritual form, it is the same old action 
as before, but it is also the first time that he completely narikiru-s “mu!” 
One can say either the monk has left behind all ritual or that he has for the 
first time performed the ritual correctly. The rōshi, who has been waiting 
for this moment, now moves into action, for finally the monk has thrown 
away all his preconceptions and is open to instruction.
Zen monks follow a code of silence about koan practice and do not con-
verse with their fellow monks about their sanzen meetings with the rōshi. 
66 Hori 1994.
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However, during ōzesshin 大接心, a week of particularly intense practice, 
first- and second-year monks in my monastery were required to announce 
after sanzen whether they had passed their koan. Those who had passed 
were allowed to return to the zendō 禅堂 (meditation hall); those who had 
not passed were required to return to the sanzen lineup to face the rōshi 
again. From this, one can make some rough judgments about the monks’ 
rate of progress. I would say that most monks pass their first koan some-
where between six months to a year after their admission to the monastery. 
This experience may be just a glimmer of insight that requires much further 
deepening, repetition, and exploration; or right from the start, it may be a 
much more thorough turnover of consciousness. Elsewhere I have tried to 
give a more analytic account of what happens in the moment of seeing a 
koan.67 I will not repeat my account here but will assert that ethnographic 
observation of Rinzai monastic koan training would show there is an expe-
rience of seeing a koan and that it is a dramatic and sudden event. It is an 
experience in the phenomenological sense which Sharf denies.68 
To sum up, Suzuki’s account of satori and his account of the koan are two 
halves of a single whole. If Suzuki’s account of satori Zen experience is an 
invented tradition, as Sharf claims, then he should also claim that the Zen 
koan practice is an invented tradition. But long before Suzuki, there were 
koan in the Chan and Zen tradition; there were koan texts; there was and 
still is a koan monastic practice. And although for years, he was the main 
source of information in the West about the koan and koan practice, Suzuki 
himself did not invent the koan tradition. 
II.   AUTHENTIC BUDDHISM AND CULTURAL NATIONALISM
Although I cannot agree with the main thrust of Sharf’s critique of Zen 
experience, I do think he is right to point out that the concept of satori has 
an ideological use and can be used strategically for political ends. However, 
I add a methodological caution: the fact that a statement has an ideologi-
cal function does not mean it is otherwise meaningless. To always ignore 
the content of a statement and to insist that it has meaning only as ideol-
ogy would be ideological reductionism. More loosely stated, statements 
in language have both denotation and connotation. To always ignore the 
denotation of a statement, its ostensive meaning, and insist it has ideologi-
67 Hori 2000; Hori 2003.
68 The Western Zen master Albert Low has described his own kenshō experience. See 
Low 2013, pp. 209–24.
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cal connotation only would be ideological reductionism. Thus far, we have 
been assessing the content of Suzuki’s account of satori and concluded 
that, in being depicted as an event in consciousness rather than as a ritual 
process, it is similar to the traditional concept of wu in classical Chan texts. 
Now it is time to assess the ideological or political impact of Suzuki’s con-
cept of satori. In this section, I will argue that indeed Suzuki did use the 
concept of satori as a protective strategy to claim for himself privileged 
access to authentic Buddhism, but in doing so he was “reflecting” a stance 
taken by the Orientalist scholars a generation before him. 
“Reflecting” is a technical term here. It is similar to what Bernard Faure 
calls “secondary Orientalism.”69 Faure does not give a precise explanation 
of “secondary Orientalism” but I would explain it like this. In Orientalism 
tout court, the Western Orientalist imposes stereotypical images on Asia 
which privilege the West over Asia, such as, “The West is logical, Asia is 
intuitive. That is why the West is superior.” This superiority justifies the 
imposition of Western authority over Asian culture. In secondary Oriental-
ism, the Asian side takes the same stereotype but reverses the polarity so 
that the contrast privileges the Asian side over the West. “The West is logi-
cal, Asia is intuitive. That is why Asia is superior.” When the Asian side 
performs this reversal of polarity, I call it “reflecting.” In addition to “sec-
ondary Orientalism,” sometimes this reversal of polarity is called “reverse 
Orientalism,” “inverted Orientalism,” or “Occidentalism.”70 D. T. Suzuki’s 
stance with regard to the Orientalist scholars and to Japanese cultural 
nationalism are instances of such “reflecting.”
The Orientalist Scholars 
Although during the sixteenth century Jesuit missionaries in China and Japan 
had written extensively about their encounter with Buddhist priests and 
monasteries, for the general public in England, Europe, and America until 
the end of the 1700s, there was little available organized information about 
Buddhism. Then in the early 1800s, retired missionaries, administrators 
returning from the colonies, and lone travelers wrote accounts of their over-
seas experiences which were widely read in the popular press. The reading 
public learned that many of the heathen practices of Asia were derived origi-
nally from a single set of beliefs and practices—a religion—which they then 
69 Faure 1993, p. 5.
70 Borup 2004.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 7 ,  264
started to call “Buddhism.”71 At first, Buddhism, with its account of endless 
karmic suffering, struck many as a religion of negativity and pessimism. 
But in mid-century there was a change of attitude. Although most Western-
ers were repelled by what they saw as the deep pessimism of the Buddhist 
teaching on suffering and karma, they agreed on the ethically noble character 
of the Buddha as a person.72 In fact, during the mid-Victorian period (1837–
1901), there was a Buddhist boom in both England and America inspired by 
the figure of the noble Buddha. In England, Edwin Arnold (1832–1904) pub-
lished a long poem lauding the Buddha, The Light of Asia, whose title drew a 
parallel with Jesus, the “light of the world.” First published in 1879, it went 
through more than a hundred printings and is still in print today. 
Inevitably Westerners saw Buddhism through the lens of Western values. 
For example, the American theologian James Freeman Clark (1810–1888) 
explicitly compared Buddhism to Protestantism; he said, “Buddhism in 
Asia, like Protestantism in Europe, is a revolt of nature against spirit, of 
humanity against caste, of individual freedom against the despotism of an 
order, of salvation by faith against salvation by sacraments.”73 
But starting in mid-century, more and more of the public’s knowledge 
of Buddhism started to come from academically trained scholars, such 
as Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852), T. W. (Thomas William) Rhys Davids 
(1843–1922), Caroline Rhys Davids (1857–1942), and Max Müller (1823–
1900). These were the first generation of Buddhist studies scholars. All 
were philologists who read and translated early Buddhist texts written in 
Pali, Sanskrit, and other classical languages. The work of these Orientalist 
scholars still stands as a great achievement. Burnouf wrote the first West-
ern-language history of Buddhism. T. W. Rhys Davids and his wife Caroline 
founded the Pali Text Society in 1881 and in the years following published 
translations of the entire Pali Canon, along with concordances, dictionar-
ies, histories, and commentaries. Max Müller edited the monumental fifty-
volume Sacred Books of the East series. Müller is also credited with the 
founding of Religionswissenschaft—the “science of religion”—or, religious 
studies, as an academic discipline. Because there was less distance at that 
time between academic publication and periodical literature for the edu-
cated classes,74 the Orientalist scholars played a major role in the public’s 
71 Masuzawa 2005, p. 122.
72 Almond 1988, p. 77.
73 Quoted in Almond 1988, p. 74.
74 Almond 1988, p. 34.
H O R I :  S U Z U K I  A N D  T H E  I N V E N T I O N  O F  T R A D I T I O N 65
understanding of Buddhism. These scholars had a particular conception of 
Buddhism and they were so influential in imposing their idea of what Bud-
dhism ought to be that it has been said “they invented Buddhism as a world 
religion.”75 Whether or not Buddhism was “invented,” the unintended result 
was, as Almond and others have noted, that in the late nineteenth century 
for people in the West, Buddhism came “to exist, not in the Orient, but in 
the Oriental libraries and institutes of the West, in its texts and manuscripts, 
at the desks of the Western savants who interpreted it. It had become a tex-
tual object, defined, classified, and interpreted through its own textuality.”76 
What was the conception of Buddhism held by the Orientalist Bud-
dhist scholars? First of all, they distinguished sharply between Buddha 
the person, worthy of great respect, and Buddhism the religion, not wor-
thy of equivalent respect. The Buddha was depicted not as a divine being 
but as a human being. He was “the Luther of Asia” standing up against 
the priests who controlled institutional religion and the caste system.77 
According to these scholars, the Buddha originally taught a system of 
rational philosophy and ethics, not a religion. He taught a system of 
ideas and a course of ethical conduct based on reason that required no 
supernatural being who created the universe and no wrathful God who 
punished the sinful. The scholars referred to this teaching as “original 
Buddhism” to distinguish it from later Buddhism, which in their view 
had degenerated into a mere religion. Scholars in the newly established 
science of religion studied how the later forms of Buddhism corrupted its 
original purity. They noted “the modifications it has undergone in various 
countries under the influence of ideas foreign, even antagonistic to itself; 
the way in which its fundamental doctrines have been overshadowed 
and destroyed by the persistent notions of Animism, by the growth of 
erroneous views as to the Buddha and the Buddhas, by the exaggerated 
importance attached to its mysticism, to its negative teaching.”78 Under 
this later degenerate Buddhism, the Orientalist scholars included all of 
Mahayana Buddhism, tantric Buddhism, and all forms of Buddhism then 
practiced by contemporary Asians. The scholars saw in the institution and 
ritual form of Mahayana Buddhism too many resemblances to Roman 
Catholicism.79 They were especially appalled by “Lamaism” which they 
75 Schober 2012, p. 14. 
76 Almond 1988, p. 13.
77 Lopez 2008, p. 5.
78 Rhys Davids 1891, p. 192.
79 Rhys Davids 1891, pp. 192–94.
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considered particularly degenerate, “the exact contrary of the earlier 
Buddhism.”80 
Several comments are in order. First, in Orientalist scholarship, the mod-
ern is authentic. The Orientalist academic scholars were evincing the sci-
entific rationalism of modernity, and using it as the criterion to distinguish 
between authentic religion and inauthentic religion. Inauthentic religion—
such as Catholicism and Mahayana Buddhism—was corrupted by super-
stition and belief in supernatural beings, whereas authentic religion, such 
as “original Buddhism,” was consistent with rational science. Looking 
back, we can see that the vision of Buddhism held by the first generation 
of Buddhist studies scholars was that of the European Enlightenment, an 
attitude which argued that religion should be rational and consistent with 
science, grounded in philosophy and ethics rather than in faith and ritual, 
and tolerant of other religions. The idea that religion should be rational and 
consistent with science is a feature of modernity. And in the late nineteenth 
century, these scholars were convinced that original Buddhism was an 
example of religion in the modern Enlightenment sense. The influence of 
the European Enlightenment’s vision of religion on Buddhism is still visible 
in the fact that the Sanskrit term, budh, which means “awakening,” is quite 
widely translated today as “enlightenment.”81 
 Second, despite the fact that the Orientalist scholars were attempting to 
study religion as a science, nevertheless they unwittingly imported what Greg-
ory Schopen calls “Protestant presuppositions” into their research: they val-
ued scriptural text above practice and assumed that popular religious practice 
was ipso facto corrupt.82 As Welter points out, “According to these presup-
positions, the Pali canon became the equivalent of the Bible, the dialogues of 
Śākyamuni paralleled the sermons of Jesus, and the activities of Śākyamuni’s 
main disciples were reminiscent of the Acts of the Apostles.”83 Despite their 
intention to be scientific and rational, the Orientalist scholars still unwittingly 
clung to the premodern association of “religion” with Protestant Christianity. 
Third, the Orientalist scholars not only favored the study of texts but 
used their Pali scholarship as a “protective strategy”84 for privileging 
themselves as authorities on authentic Buddhism and for disenfranchising 
others. For these scholars, the Pali texts were uniquely important because, 
80 Rhys Davids 1907, p. 208.
81 Cohen 2006, pp. 1–3.
82 Schopen 1991.
83 Welter 2008, p. 16.
84 Proudfoot 1985, p. 199.
H O R I :  S U Z U K I  A N D  T H E  I N V E N T I O N  O F  T R A D I T I O N 67
as the earliest texts, they were closest to what the historical Buddha taught 
and were thus less subject to misinterpretation and distortion by later gen-
erations of priests. With this claim, the Orientalist academic scholars made 
themselves the exclusive gatekeepers to authentic Buddhism since their 
ability to read early Pali texts was the key to the gate. The people who actu-
ally practiced Buddhism in the Asian countries became disenfranchised 
since they did not read the Pali texts. When seen in ideological perspec-
tive, the Orientalists’ concept of “original Buddhism” functioned politically 
to draw an insider/outsider line between two groups of people, those who 
cannot read ancient Pali texts and therefore have no business discussing 
Buddhism, and those who can read ancient Pali texts and are therefore the 
judges of authentic Buddhism. D. T. Suzuki’s use of satori “reflects” this 
use of Pali text scholarship. In the Orientalist scholar’s understanding, only 
those who can read the original Pali texts have access to authentic original 
Buddhism. In Suzuki’s understanding, only those who have had the experi-
ence of satori are qualified to talk about Zen. 
Fourth, in the Orientalists’ definition of authentic Buddhism, Mahayana 
Buddhism—all of the Buddhism of East Asia—was excluded. D. T. Suzuki 
challenged the Orientalist scholars’ hegemony over what counts as authen-
tic Buddhism. In the opening pages of Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, 
published in 1907, Suzuki clearly identifies the basic assumptions of the 
Orientalist scholars.
What is generally known to the Western nations by the name of 
Buddhism is Hīnayānism, whose scriptures . . . are written in Pāli 
and studied mostly in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. It was through 
this language that the first knowledge of Buddhism was acquired 
by Orientalists; and naturally they came to regard Hīnayānism 
or Southern Buddhism as the only genuine teachings of the Bud-
dha. They insisted, and some of them still insist, that to have an 
adequate and thorough knowledge of Buddhism, they must con-
fine themselves solely to the study of the Pāli, that whatever may 
be learned from other sources, i.e., from the Sanskrit, Tibetan, 
or Chinese documents should be considered as throwing only a 
side-light on the reliable information obtained from the Pāli, and 
further that the knowledge derived from the former should in 
certain cases be discarded as accounts of a degenerated form of 
Buddhism.85 
85 Suzuki 1907, p. 11.
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Suzuki challenged the Orientalists’ conception of “original Buddhism” 
(Suzuki’s term is “primitive Buddhism”) on several points.86 First, consistent 
with the theory of evolution, the new scientific theory of the day then sweep-
ing the field, Suzuki argued that religion was a living thing and constantly 
evolving. The Orientalists’ “original Buddhism” was only the historical early 
manifestation of authentic Buddhism. It was the acorn from which would 
grow a great oak.87 In the same vein, he argued that the Buddhist conception 
of karma was “scientifically verified”88 and that the Buddhist conception of 
non-atman, when seen from its positive aspect, was what physical science 
called “the law of the conservation of energy and of matter.”89 Second, he 
wrote to correct misconceptions that people had of Mahayana, such as the 
meaning of nirvana or the bodhisattva. He took the opportunity to criticize 
Christians, both for the wilful prejudice of Christian missionaries90 and for 
the inadvertent ignorance of Christian scholars.91 Finally, in an extended 
discussion, he argued that there was a “spirit of religion” which manifested 
itself here as Christianity and there as Buddhism, each a legitimate expres-
sion of authentic religion.92 
Above these ground-level tactical arguments, Suzuki’s general strategy 
was to “reflect” the Orientalist stance to privileged access. Just as the Ori-
entalist scholars claimed privileged access to authentic Buddhism through 
Pali text study, Suzuki claimed privileged access to authentic Buddhism 
through the experience of satori. In Zen terms, he was “taking the enemy’s 
spear and stabbing him with it.”93 
Cultural Nationalism
I do not agree with, or defend, D. T. Suzuki’s claims about Zen and Japa-
nese culture, but I attempt to explain what might have motivated him to 
make those claims. Briefly, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries Japanese Buddhism was faced with the task of modernizing itself but 
it could not do so on a level East-West playing field. In the mid-nineteenth 
86 Judith Snodgrass has detailed D. T. Suzuki’s efforts to establish an “Eastern Buddhism” 
(Snodgrass 2003).
87 Suzuki (1927) 1970, p. 41.
88 Suzuki 1907, p. 35.
89 Suzuki 1907, p. 43.
90 Suzuki 1907, p. 17.
91 Suzuki 1907, pp. 18–22.
92 Suzuki 1907, pp. 23–30. 
93 Hori 2003, pp. 55–56.
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century, convinced of white European racial superiority, the Western pow-
ers forcefully broke the Japanese policy of national isolation, imposed 
unequal treaties on Japan and China, and in general semi-colonized the two 
nations. To the Western powers, the Asian nations were barbarian cultures 
in contrast to the civilized West. To the Asian nations also, the Western 
countries were barbarian cultures in contrast to civilized Asia. The Western 
countries however were militarily much stronger and ruthlessly imposed 
their will on the Asian nations just as they had done to the countries of the 
Americas and Africa. The Japanese saw the need to modernize and become 
technically stronger, but they did not want to westernize. They refused to 
accept Western cultural values, since those values included the assumption 
that Asia was culturally inferior to the West. In the arena of religion, D. T. 
Suzuki proposed a new modern Buddhism that showed, he said, the cultural 
superiority of Japan. In general, in the stance that he took he was “reflecting” 
the Western powers attitude to Japan.
Suzuki used to say that Zen provided a neutral ground where East and 
West and the world’s religions could meet. “Zen is the ultimate fact of all 
philosophy and religion. . . . Every religious faith must spring from it if it 
has to prove at all efficiently and livingly workable in our active life.”94 
Other religions were inextricably imbedded in local culture, thus preventing 
people from seeing the truth of religions in other cultures. Only Zen was free 
of any sort of local culture; it was, in Sharf’s language, an “ahistorical, trans-
cultural experience of ‘pure subjectivity’ which utterly transcends discursive 
thought.”95 Zen thus was not merely the equal of any of the world religions; 
it was the experiential core of every philosophy and religion and thus the 
common ground upon which world religions could meet. At the same time, 
Zen was the unique possession of Japan. Japanese culture had so absorbed 
Zen that Zen influenced the national culture and the national character. It 
was Zen which defined what made the Japanese unique, especially in con-
trast to Western culture and character.96 Thus Sharf concludes, “Suzuki . . . 
places this understanding of Zen in the interests of a transparently nationalist 
discourse.”97 Thus, what started out looking like a liberal cosmopolitan inter-
cultural platform turns out to be another example of nihonjinron 日本人論, a 
self-congratulating theory of the uniqueness of the Japanese character.
94 Suzuki (1927) 1970, p. 268.
95 Sharf 1993, p. 1.
96 Sharf 1993, pp. 25–26.
97 Sharf 1998, p. 101; see also Sharf 1993, pp. 24–25.
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I suggest that Suzuki’s cultural nationalism was his response to the West’s 
cultural imperialism. He was “reflecting” the West’s presumption of cultural 
superiority. Starting in the premodern period, as it learned more and more 
about the countries of America, Africa, and Asia, the European West orga-
nized its knowledge of foreign cultures and races into a hierarchy in which 
Europe always occupied a position of superiority. Only the European West 
had civilization; the other countries of the world were at different stages of 
being barbarian or savage. At first, Western racial attitudes to the countries 
of Asia were rather mild and not very prejudiced. For example, in the six-
teenth century, Jesuit missionaries such as Francis Xavier (1506–1552) in 
Japan and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) in China reported that the Japanese 
and the Chinese had strong cultures and were just as technically advanced 
as the West.98 The Jesuits in China described Confucianism as a noble phi-
losophy on a par with the thought of Greece and Rome.99 Significantly, the 
Jesuits said that both the Japanese and Chinese were white in skin color.100 
At that time, the Japanese and Chinese military were also stronger than the 
level of military force the Western powers could muster in Asia.101 
China considered itself the center of the civilized world and its expe-
rience with these representatives from barbarian Europe did nothing to 
change its mind. In 1640, at the beginning of the Tokugawa period (1603–
1868), the Japanese shogunate expelled all foreigners from the country and 
imposed a policy of national isolation: no foreigners were allowed into the 
country and no Japanese person was allowed out. The only exception to this 
policy was the small trading post of Dejima in Nagasaki harbor where the 
Dutch (and Chinese) were allowed to trade. This policy of national isolation 
remained in place for two hundred and twenty years. 
During this long interlude, the balance of power changed. While Japan 
and China remained apparently suspended in time, many of the countries of 
the Western world developed powerful navies that allowed them to extend 
their military power across the seas to distant foreign countries. England, 
Holland, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, the United States, Germany, and 
other countries built highly lucrative overseas trading empires in Africa, 
Asia, and the Americas, sometimes by colonizing entire countries. In the 
colonial period, when the European powers approached less developed 
98 Kowner 2014, p. 77.
99 Rowbotham 1945, p. 224.
100 Kowner and Demel 2013, pp. 46–48.
101 Kowner and Demel 2013, p. 11.
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countries around the world, it was with an attitude of racial superiority. The 
Europeans considered the indigenous peoples of their foreign colonies to 
be uncivilized—they gave off a bodily stench, had barbaric customs, were 
promiscuous, lacked the ability to think, and were violent and incapable 
of governing themselves. Extremists went so far as to say that slavery was 
justified since Africans were subhuman, therefore beasts, and therefore 
property.102 White Europeans were naturally meant to lead and dominate 
the world. These white racist attitudes were buttressed by citations from the 
Bible, philosophical argument, phrenology, social Darwinism, and theories 
of scientific racism. Leaders openly argued for white supremacy.103 
During the Tokugawa period, although the trading ships of the Western 
powers were refused entry into Japan, Western nations carried on a lucra-
tive trade with China. The Japanese watched the developments in China 
with fear. The great Western demand for things made in China—mainly 
tea, but also silks and porcelain—was not matched by a similar demand 
in China for things manufactured in the West. Western traders paid in sil-
ver for Chinese goods, but since the Chinese did not buy anything from 
the West, the silver never came back to the Western traders. Over time, 
China accumulated so much silver bullion that there was not enough cur-
rency in international circulation to allow other countries to carry on easy 
trade. Wanting to restore the balance of payments, the Western powers 
sought for something manufactured in the West which they could sell 
to the Chinese in large quantities and get paid in silver. They found that 
something in opium. Although the Chinese emperor had officially banned 
the import and sale of opium, the British East India Company grew great 
quantities of opium in India and sold the opium to private traders who 
then shipped it to China and smuggled it into the country. By encourag-
ing and feeding the appetite for opium in China, the British succeeded 
in reversing the flow of silver bullion. “Opium . . . flowed freely from 
all of India to Canton, and by 1836, total imports came to $18 million, 
making it the world’s most valuable single commodity trade of the nine-
teenth century.”104 
In China, not only did addiction to opium spread further and further 
through all levels of society, but in addition, the massive profits to be made 
caused widespread corruption throughout the government bureaucracy and 
102 Seth 2014, p. 769.
103 Kowner and Demel 2013; Kowner 2014.
104 Wakeman 1978, p. 172.
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the merchant class. The British felt no guilt for spreading the addiction and 
encouraging the corruption. When the emperor sent a special commissioner 
to Canton to finally shut down once and for all the smuggling of opium into 
the country, Britain responded by sending its warships in defence of the 
British traders’ right to smuggle opium into China. Britain fought the First 
Opium War with China during the years 1839–1842. The Second Opium 
War was fought from 1856 to 1860 with France participating. With superior 
naval gunpower and disciplined soldiers, the British inflicted humiliating 
defeats upon the Chinese. The treaties which ended these wars forced China 
to pay large cash indemnities, open five ports for trade, cede the island of 
Hong Kong to British control and establish extraterritoriality for Western-
ers.105 These were the first of the so-called “unequal treaties” for China. 
Until that time, China had considered itself the center of human civilization, 
but the imposition of the unequal treaties introduced what the Chinese call “a 
century of national humiliation” (Ch. bainian guochi 百年國恥). 
In Japan, Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States sailed his 
“black ships” into Uraga Bay in 1853, ten years after the end of the First 
Opium War and three years before the outbreak of the Second Opium War. 
He threatened to bombard the capital city of Edo if the Japanese govern-
ment did not recognize him and enter into serious diplomatic negotiations 
to open the country to trade. The frightened shogunate acquiesced and the 
Convention of Kanagawa was signed in 1854, the first of the “unequal trea-
ties” for Japan. This treaty terminated the policy of national isolation and 
established trading ports for the United States and an American consul posi-
tion. The treaty in turn led to a series of unequal treaties with other Western 
powers that Japan was forced into signing—with the United States and 
Britain in 1854; Netherlands, Russia, and France in 1858; Prussia in 1861; 
and Austria and Spain in 1868. As Krämer has noted, through the imposi-
tion of these unequal treaties, the Western powers in effect semi-colonized 
Japan106 and subjected it to great national humiliation. 
In these treaties, China and Japan had to concede extraterritoriality to the 
Western powers. The concession of extraterritoriality signaled the unequal 
status of China and Japan vis-à-vis the European powers. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, the European powers had created a typology of 
nation-states which structured international diplomacy. Fundamental to this 
structure was the classification of nations into a hierarchy of “civilized,” 
105 Wakeman 1978, p. 212.
106 Krämer 2015, p. 9.
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“barbarian,” and “savage.”107 Japan was classed as barbarian although it 
was recognized that if Japan continued to progress in modernization, its 
status might be rejudged.108 As a “barbarian” state, Japan did not have the 
same rights as a “civilized” state. 
Even when diplomatic relations have been established between 
them, the recognition of a semi-barbarous State does not extend 
to its municipal law, either public or private, except as regards 
its own citizen within its frontiers. The recognizing States conse-
quently maintain separate courts, exercising separate jurisdiction 
within the borders of the partially recognized State; and to these 
courts is intrusted the decision of all questions between the citi-
zens of the recognising States.109
Practically speaking, if a Westerner in a Chinese or Japanese treaty port 
committed a criminal act by local Chinese or Japanese law, the Chinese or 
Japanese police could not arrest that Westerner and try him in a local court. 
Extraterritoriality meant that the Western power maintained a separate court 
system which administered Western law even though the treaty port was on 
Chinese or Japanese soil. As a barbarian state, Japan did not have final legal 
authority over its own territory.
In its relations and negotiations with the West, Japan constantly sought 
to show how civilized it was. For example, in 1893 the United States orga-
nized the Columbian Exposition, the celebration of four-hundred years 
since Columbus’s discovery of America. At the exposition, the Japanese 
government constructed an exhibit hall in traditional Japanese architecture 
called the “Hōōden” 鳳凰殿, or “Phoenix Pavilion.” It consisted of three 
wings which Snodgrass describes thus: “The Fujiwara wing showed the ele-
gance and sophistication of Japanese culture centuries before the discovery 
of America, the Ashikaga wing showed the state of Japanese development 
at the time of Columbus’s discovery, and the Tokugawa wing showed the 
continuation of the high level of Japanese cultural tradition up to the arrival 
of Western influences.”110 The message is unmistakeable: Japan was “civi-
lized” long before America was discovered and the United States as a coun-
try was born. The exposition hosted the World’s Parliament of Religions in 
107 Lorimer 1883, p. 101. 
108 Lorimer 1883, pp. 102–3. 
109 Lorimer 1883, p. 217. 
110 Snodgrass 2003, p. 33.
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Chicago inviting representatives from Christian and non-Christian religions 
from around the world. One of the Japanese representatives, Hirai Kinzō 
平井金三111 (1859–1924), connected the unequal treaties, religion, and 
racial discrimination. He said, not being Christian, the Japanese “are being 
called heathen; and this is one of the reasons why our rightful claim to 
revise the treaty, stipulated forty years ago between the Western powers and 
Japan on an unequal and disadvantageous footing, is still ignored.”112 Japan 
constantly sought to be accepted into the group of “civilized” nations but 
was never granted actual acceptance.
In its relationship with the West, Japan always suffered from this West-
ern-based racism institutionalized in the unequal treaties and expressed 
in the international politics of the day. D. T. Suzuki was born in 1870, 
two years after the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, and grew up in 
the new Japan which was struggling to create a modern Japanese national 
identity for itself. Suzuki’s genius was that he was able to take the West’s 
demeaning stereotypes of Asia and reverse them to assert the superiority 
of Asia:
There is truth in saying that the Oriental mind is intuitive while 
the Western mind is logical and discursive. An intuitive mind has 
its weaknesses, it is true, but its strongest point is demonstrated 
when it deals with things most fundamental in life, that is, things 
related to religion, art, and metaphysics. And it is Zen that has 
particularly established this fact—in satori. The idea that the ulti-
mate truth of life and of things generally is to be intuitively and 
not conceptually grasped, and that this intuitive prehension is the 
foundation not only of philosophy but of all other cultural activi-
ties, is what the Zen form of Buddhism has contributed to the cul-
tivation of artistic appreciation among the Japanese people.113 
The Orientalist stereotype—the West is logical, the Orient is intuitive—was 
first used by the Western side to privilege the West. Suzuki took the same 
stereotype but reversed its polarity making it privilege the East. Bernard 
Faure pointed out this reversal of Orientalism: “If the Western standpoint 
represented an Orientalism ‘by default,’ one in which Buddhism was looked 
111 While Snodgrass (2003) provides “Kinzō” as the reading for his given name, Japanese 
scholarship seems to read this as “Kinza.” See especially, Yoshinaga 2007, p. 7. 
112 Snodgrass 2003, p. 182.
113 Suzuki 1959, p. 219.
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down upon, Suzuki and Nishida, among others, represent an Orientalism ‘by 
excess,’ a ‘secondary’ Orientalism that offers an idealized, ‘nativist’ image 
of a Japanese culture deeply influenced by Zen.”114 And Faure also seems 
to be saying that given the historical context, it is quite understandable that 
Suzuki should use Orientalist categories in this way. “Admittedly, only a 
discourse blind to its own conditions of production could blame Nishida 
(or Suzuki) for using Orientalist categories and chauvinistic rhetoric at the 
time he wrote—a time when the opposition of East and West had become 
an all-powerful collective representation.”115 In any case, Suzuki’s cultural 
nationalism, privileging the culture of Japan, did not arise in a vacuum. It 
was a “reflection” of earlier Western Orientalist images of Asia.
On Academic Scholarship Today
Who is the judge of what counts as authentic Buddhism? The argument 
continues today. D. T. Suzuki represents the side of the committed practi-
tioner of Zen. Representing the side of rational objectivity is the scholarship 
of modern-day academic religious studies. 
In 1870, Friedrich Max Müller gave four lectures on Religionswissen-
schaft, “the science of religion,” and published them in 1872 under the title 
Lectures on the Science of Religion.116 This event is often treated as the 
beginning of the new modern academic study of religion. Whereas previous 
scholarship often focused on establishing the truth of one religion, the new 
science of religion would be more secular in outlook. Rhys Davids stated, 
“The task of the historian of religious belief is . . . simply to ascertain, if 
he can, the process by which men have come to believe as they do.”117 By 
speaking of the study of religion as a “science,” Müller meant that religion 
could be studied without letting one’s personal convictions about true and 
false religion prejudice judgment. He said: “The very title of the Science 
of Religion jars on the ears of many persons, and a comparison of all the 
religions of the world, in which none can claim a privileged position, must 
seem to many reprehensible in itself, because ignoring that peculiar rever-
ence which everybody, down to the mere fetich [sic] worshipper, feels for 
his own religion and his own God.”118 Müller took a rigorous stance against 
114 Faure 1993, p. 53. 
115 Faure 1993, p. 87.
116 Müller 1872.
117 Rhys Davids 1891, p. 8.
118 Müller 1872, p. 7.
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such preference for one’s own religion: “True reverence is shown in treat-
ing every subject, however sacred, however dear to us, with complete 
confidence; without fear and without favour; with tenderness and love, by 
all means; but, before all, by an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty to 
truth.”119 
This was the creed of the new academic study of religion putting into 
effect the modernist assumptions of the European Enlightenment. Human 
reason was sufficient for understanding the world on its own; no miracles, 
no revelation, and no churchly institution was necessary. At the same time, 
empirical observation focused on factuality that promised to be objective 
and free of subjective bias. But despite the rhetoric of “an unflinching and 
uncompromising loyalty to truth,” Müller expected that scientific research 
in religion would prove the truth of Christianity, albeit an Enlightenment 
Christianity consistent with science. The great scientific conception in 
the second half of the nineteenth century was the theory of evolution. In 
1859, Charles Darwin had published his influential book, On the Origin of 
Species. Scholars of religion applied the theory of evolution to their own 
field, classifying the many religions which explorers were discovering in 
America, Africa, and Asia. But these scholars of religion gave the theory 
a teleological interpretation. In their view, the pagan religions of barbar-
ian and less civilized societies had the same religious goals as Christian-
ity but were fixed at a lower level of evolutionary development. Thus, 
Max Müller, although a vocal proponent of the new science of religion, 
still expected that the science of religion would prove the superiority 
of Christianity: “I make no secret that true Christianity seems to me to 
become more and more exalted the more we appreciate the treasures of 
truth hidden in the despised religions of the world.”120 Christianity was 
the ultimate expression of the human faculty for religion. Other religions 
were struggling to become what Christianity already was. He said, “If we 
look but steadily into those black Chinese eyes, we shall find that there, 
too, there is a soul that responds to a soul, and that the God whom they 
mean is the same God whom we mean, however helpless their utterance, 
however imperfect their worship.”121 Even in the new “science of reli-
gion,” the central concept “religion” was still being implicitly defined in 
terms of a Christian prototype. Even the new secular study of religion 
119 Müller 1872, p. 6.
120 Müller 1872, p. 22.
121 Müller 1872, p. 83; see also Cohen 2006, p. 5.
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assumed that it could identify authentic religion and that the one authentic 
religion would be Christianity.
When Sharf describes Suzuki’s account of Zen as “invented tradition,” 
the term implies that Suzuki’s Zen is not authentic Buddhism. We have seen 
that when a critic makes a declaration about what is or is not authentic Bud-
dhism, at the same time he often also claims privileged access. An academic 
scholar these days has a ready-made protective strategy for privileging him-
self as an authority on authentic Buddhism and for disenfranchising others. 
He claims to occupy the position of “rational objectivity” and charges that 
a committed practitioner’s judgment will be subjectively biased. Thus, the 
committed practitioner’s judgments are excluded from consideration. But 
when we compare “rational objectivity” and “Zen experience” as strategic 
performance, we discover that rather than being opposed to each other, 
they are, in fact, reflections of each other. Objectivity is held to be a state of 
mind, a kind of consciousness. So also, Zen experience is held to be a state 
of mind, a kind of consciousness. According to the rhetoric of objectivity, 
an objective or rational mind sees things as they are without imposing its 
own biased point of view—as does Zen experience. Buddhist wisdom is 
just “seeing things as they are” without self-centeredness. People who are 
skeptical of rational objectivity doubt that there is such a thing as an objec-
tive mind. People who are skeptical of Zen doubt that there is such a thing 
as the experience of satori. Most important, rational objectivity is used ideo-
logically to draw an insider/outsider line between groups of people. Only 
those who are “objective” and “rational,” such as scholars of religion, are 
qualified to speak in the academy, while those who are not “objective” or 
“rational,” such as practitioners of a religion, are disqualified. This exactly 
parallels the “protective strategy” of defenders of religious experience. 
Only those who have had Zen experience are qualified to speak about Zen 
enlightenment, while outsiders to the Zen experience are disqualified. If we 
ignore their content and focus on their political and performative functions, 
we discover that the rational objectivity of the academic scholar and the 
non-rational Zen experience of the practitioner perform the same ideologi-
cal function. Both claim to provide their holders with privileged access to 
authentic Buddhism.
CONCLUSION
The term “invention of tradition” is not precisely defined, but in nuance it 
implies an act of manufacturing something without historical precedent and 
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pretending that it is historical tradition. The term is used pejoratively. Rob-
ert Sharf employs the term to describe D. T. Suzuki’s account of Zen satori 
which, he argues, is derived more from Western thought than from tradi-
tional Buddhism. In the first part of this paper, I have focused on the content 
of Suzuki’s account of satori, and using the CBETA database search func-
tion argued that Suzuki’s account of satori closely resembles the concept of 
wu (Jp. go or satori) in classical Chinese Chan texts: they are both depicted 
as an event in consciousness and not as ritual process. Thus my conclusion 
is that Suzuki’s account of satori is not an “invention of tradition” based on 
Western sources. It is, in fact, “the tradition” itself based on classical Chan 
sources. 
The second half of the paper considers Suzuki’s writings not for their 
doctrinal content but for their ideological impact. Sharf performs such an 
ideological analysis and finds that Suzuki promotes a cultural nationalism 
that depicts the culture of Japan as superior to the West. Here Sharf’s ideo-
logical analysis does not go far enough. Suzuki was not writing in a histori-
cal vacuum. He was born in 1870, two years after the Meiji Restoration. All 
during the last several decades of the nineteenth century, the Western pow-
ers explicitly labelled Japan a “barbarian” country, refused to treat Japan 
as an equal, and imposed demeaning unequal treaties on Japan, in effect 
reducing it to semi-colonial status. If Sharf’s analysis had adopted a broader 
focus, it would have shown the historical continuity in Suzuki’s ideologi-
cal position. Suzuki’s insistence that only a person who had experienced 
satori knew what Zen was reflected the Orientalist scholars’ insistence that 
only one who could read ancient Pali texts knew what original Buddhism 
was. They both claimed privileged access to authentic Buddhism. And 
when Suzuki argued that the West is logical while Asia is intuitive, and that 
is why Asia is superior, he “invented” that contrast from the longstanding 
stereotype that the West is logical while Asia is intuitive, and that is why 
the West is superior. In claiming superiority for Japanese culture, he was 
“reflecting” the Western powers’ assumption of the racial superiority of 
Europe over Asia. In analyzing the ideological impact of Suzuki’s writings, 
if we see Suzuki in historical perspective, then we will see that rather than 
“invent tradition,” he “reflected” tradition. 
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